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Abstract 
 
Crime is one of the most harmful social problems throughout the world suggesting 
that the topic of crime is one of the most important research areas within the field 
of economics. This thesis attempts to shed some new light on the relationship 
between crime and gross domestic product (GDP) in the Nordic countries. More 
specifically the aim of the paper is to look for the existence of a cointegration 
relationship between GDP and various categories of crime in Sweden using annual 
data from 1950 to 2012. It does this by means of the bounds-testing approach to 
cointegration and vector error correction models. It further tests for Granger 
causality.  
The results differ depending on the crime category. They do, however, show that 
there indeed exists a long-run equilibrium relationship between GDP and some 
crime categories while not with others. Furthermore, Granger causality results 
imply that GDP is more often than not a determinant of crime rather than a result 
of crime.  
 Keywords: Crime, GDP, Bounds-testing approach, VECM, Granger causality 
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1. Introduction  
Crime constitutes a significant activity in most economies. On the one hand, it allows for the 
consumption of various illegal goods and services. On the other, criminal activity can be 
socially harmful, and the resulting cost may be substantial. Although estimates of the total costs 
of crime in a society are by the nature of the phenomenon not very accurate, the available 
estimates suggest that this cost is high (e.g. Anderson, 1999; Cohen et al., 2004; Webber, 
2010). No matter what the true cost is, it is undeniable that crime is one of the most harmful 
social problems throughout the world. Thus the implication is that the topic of crime is one of 
the most important research areas within the field of economics (Glaeser, 1999).  
Although crime plays such a significant role in most economies the relationship between gross 
domestic product (GDP) and crime remains unclear. The theoretical relationship is vastly 
complex with both positive and negative bidirectional causality being possible. This not only 
suggests a problem regarding external validity of empirical work but also results in endogeneity 
being a major identification challenge.  
This paper attempts to address the identification challenge by applying time-series and 
simultaneous equation models which reduces the probability of endogeneity bias (Brandt and 
Williams, 2007). More specifically the aim of the paper is to look for the existence of a 
cointegration relationship between GDP and various categories of crime in Sweden using 
yearly data from 1950 to 2012. Following Narayan and Smyth (2004) and Chen (2009) this is 
done by means of a bounds-testing approach to cointegration and vector error correction 
models (VECM). Furthermore, regardless of whether such a relationship exists, Granger 
causality tests will be employed to examine the direction of causality. 
While the use of cointegration and Granger causality has been increasing when analysing the 
relationship between crime and macroeconomic indicators (see Masih and Masih, 1996; 
Narayan and Smyth, 2004; Chen, 2009; Detotto and Manuela, 2010), this kind of study has 
never been done within the Nordic Countries.  
The Nordic countries are often specified as welfare-states with low prison populations, 
knowledge-based crime policies and an absence of serious punitive measures in the public 
debate (Estrada, Pettersson and Shannon, 2012). This makes the Nordic countries an interesting 
focal point for crime research. Especially so, since the GDP-crime relationship may differ in 
the Nordic countries from that of other countries. This thesis is limited to only one of the Nordic 
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countries, the choice being Sweden. Sweden has recorded crime statistics from as early as 1950, 
which are readily available, and span various categories of crime  
Understanding the relationship between GDP and crime over time is crucial. It may reveal that 
GDP is one of the many determinants of crime, it further may affect crime in the short-run as 
well as the long-run. The subject of the determinants of crime has long been of interest to 
researchers (e.g. Becker, 1968; Ehrlich, 1975; Freeman, 1999; Levitt, 2004). The relationship 
may also reveal that crime affects GDP, either in the short-run, the long-run or both. If so, it 
provides important information when estimating the total cost of crime as well as when 
constructing crime-fighting policies. It can give an important indication of how much effort 
should be put into fighting crime and which categories of crime are the most harmful. It can 
thus imply what type of policies are the most efficient in reducing the social costs of crime.   
This thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the previous empirical literature. Section 
3 discusses the possible theoretical relationships between GDP and various criminal activities, 
paying special attention to the difficulties resulting from the complex theoretical relationships. 
Section 4 explains the main econometric methods used in the thesis. Section 5 presents the data 
used and its main drawbacks. Section 6 reports on the empirical results of the analysis along 
with a discussion of the main findings. Section 7 is the conclusion.  
2. Previous Research 
The relationship between crime and macroeconomic variables remains unclear. Previous 
economic research, both theoretical and empirical, has by large part focused on the relationship 
between crime and unemployment usually finding a positive correlation (see e.g. Freeman 
(1999) for a review of the earlier literature). In the last decade the literature on the empirical 
relationship between crime and economic growth has increased. Regardless of a complex 
theoretical relationship most results are in consensus of a negative association between 
economic performance and criminal activity. 
One of the earlier studies on crime and growth was done by Mauro (1995). He used country-
level panel data to investigate the relationship between corruption and growth in the early 
1980s. The dataset included 67 countries from all over the world. Using both ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS) he finds a significant negative relationship. 
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Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004) do a similar study where they use growth regression analysis on 
country-level panel data for 48 countries worldwide, for the period of 1975-1996. They also 
find a negative relationship between corruption and economic growth.  Gaibulloev and Sandler 
(2008; 2009) use panel data to analyse the impact of terrorism on growth separately in West-
Europe and in Asia. In both cases they find that terrorism has a significant negative effect on 
growth.  
Regarding more conventional crimes, Arvanites and Defina (2006) use a fixed effects model 
for US states to estimate the effect of business cycles on street crime in the period of 1986-
2001. They found that an improving economy has a significant negative effect on property 
crime and robberies. Cardenas (2007) using a vector autoregressive (VAR) model shows that 
crime has a negative impact on productivity thereby decreasing economic growth in Columbia. 
Detotto and Otranto (2010) use monthly Italian data and an autoregressive state space model 
to measure the impact of crime on economic growth. They conclude that crime has a negative 
effect on economic growth.  Detotto and Manuela (2010) use quarterly Italian data between 
1981 and 2005 to analyse the causal and temporal relationship between crime and economic 
indicators related to the aggregated demand function. Using Johansen method to cointegration 
and Granger causality they find that in the short run crime positively affects GDP and public 
spending while in the long run it negatively effects investment and public spending.  
Narayan and Smyth (2004) and Chen (2009) use small samples to test for long-run and causal 
relationships between various types of crime, unemployment and income. Both do this by 
means of the bounds-testing approach to cointegration and Granger causality tests. Narayan 
and Smyth (2004) use annual data in Australia and found that fraud, homicide and motor 
vehicle theft are cointegrated with both unemployment and income. They further found some 
evidence that unemployment, homicide and vehicle theft Granger cause income in the long 
term, but that long-run income and unemployment Granger cause fraud. Chen (2009) uses 
annual data in Taiwan. He finds that there is a clear long-run equilibrium relationship between 
unemployment, income and total crime. He further finds that unemployment, theft and 
economic fraud Granger cause income. 
Limited research on the relationship between crime and macroeconomic indicators has been 
done in the Nordic countries. Blomquist and Westerlund (2014) use Swedish county panel data 
from 1975-2010 to analyse cointegration between crime and unemployment. Their results do 
not support a long-run relationship. Krüger (2011) used a wavelet-based approach to analyse 
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the impact of economic fluctuations on crime in Sweden. He uses Swedish monthly crime data 
from the beginning of 1995 and finds that all crime rates share seasonal behaviour with 
aggregate economic activity. Furthermore he concludes that alcohol and drug related crimes as 
well as economic crimes are pro-cyclical while property crimes, violent crimes and sexual 
crimes move counter-cyclically with economic activity. 
3. The Theoretical Relationship between GDP and Crime 
The possible theoretical relationship between GDP and crime is quite complex. GDP can affect 
crime, both in a positive and a negative direction. Crime can also affect GDP, both positively 
and negatively. In order to fully comprehend the relationship between GDP and crime one must 
understand the concept of GDP. Hence this chapter is organized as follows. It starts with a brief 
explanation of the concept of GDP. It then moves on to discussing how GDP can affect crime 
followed by a discussion on how crime can affect GDP. Lastly, it discusses how this complex 
relationship may result in estimation difficulties.  
3.1 The Concept of GDP 
The aim of economic organization is to maximize the availability of goods and services to the 
members of society (e.g. Varian, 1992). GDP is designed to measure the market value of all 
final goods and services produced within an economy during a given time period, usually a 
year (e.g. Mankiw and Taylor, 2006). The GDP measure is essentially the sum of all the value–
added (wages and profits) produced within the economy during the period in question.1  
GDP is a production concept but may also be viewed from the expenditure side and the income 
side employing the following identities (e.g. Rowan, 1968):  
 ( , ) L KY K L C G I X M w L w K                  
(1) 
where the first expression on the left hand side is the economy wide (net) production function, 
the middle expression represents how the production is allocated to various uses (expenditure 
account) and the right hand side views GDP from the income side. In the production function 
                                                 
1  Note that deterioration in the (real) value of capital, natural resources etc. is essentially negative production 
and value added. 
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K stands for capital and L labour used in the production. In the expenditure account, C stands 
for private consumption, G for public consumption, I for investment, X for exports and M for 
imports. In the income account, wL represents the remuneration of labour and wK the 
remuneration of capital per unit. Expression (1) is an accounting identity (Rowan, 1968).  
While the measure of GDP is meant to incorporate the value of all final production within an 
economy it fails to do so in various ways, one of them being that GDP typically fails to include 
income generated in an underground economy (United Nations, 2008). The main reason for 
this is that in practice GDP is typically measured on the basis of data on market trade and 
production collected by the statistical authorities (Landefeld, Seskin and Fraumeni, 2008). 
Activities within the underground economy are illegal (typically do not move along the usual 
marketing channels) and hence are generally not reported to the official data collection agencies 
or easily measured by them.  
Assuming that illegal activities in the underground economy result in the production of some 
valuable goods and/or services2 then GDP, as traditionally measured, underestimates the total 
value of production in the economy. For example, in Sweden the underground market 
production was estimated to be approximately 10-17% of the gross national product (GNP) 
around the 1990s using indirect methods, while around 4-5% of GDP in 2005 using a survey 
(Schneider and Enste, 2002; Davis and Henrekson, 2010).3 Thus, although illegal production 
should positively affect GDP it usually does not.  
Examples of illegal production of goods and services that GDP fails to embody are the 
production and sale of illegal drugs and prostitution. These can involve voluntary trade between 
two individuals and are therefore not only contributing to total production but are also utility-
enhancing to both individuals as well as socially beneficial to the extent that the exchange 
generates more benefits to the users than external disutility to others. 
3.2 From Crime to GDP  
While all crime is aimed at increasing the offender’s utility and all crime seemingly involves 
some risk to the offender of being apprehended and possibly penalised. These crimes 
additionally involve one or more victims which suffer additional costs as a result of the crime 
                                                 
2 If one believes in the rational individual this must be true in the long run, since one would not go into production 
of goods or services which would not pay off in the long run. 
3 Andersson (1999) puts the annual aggregate cost of crime in the US at well over 1 trillion US$ or some 8-10% 
of the US GDP. In the UK the total cost of only violent crime was estimated to be approximately £124 billion in 
2012 or approximately 8% of GDP (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2013).  
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(Ehrlich, 1975). These include property crimes, vandalism, violent crimes, sexual crimes and 
fraud.  
Crime against property undermines property rights and thus has a negative impact on both trade 
and accumulation (see e.g. Árnason, 2000; Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2004). More specifically, 
the risk of having one’s property stolen, destroyed or vandalised has a negative impact on 
investment. Individuals and firms will be less inclined to invest if there is a risk that instead of 
themselves, others reap the benefits of the investment. Since trade is an exchange of property 
rights, clearly with weaker property rights there will be less trade leading to less specialization 
and greater inefficiencies.   
All crimes that result in an unexpected cost to one or more individuals (victims) have the 
potential to further result in a reduction in social trust. This reduction in trust simply reflects 
the risk of being a victim of a crime. Lower levels of trust, in turn, decrease the efficiency of 
trade via e.g. additional transaction costs (e.g. Burchell and Wilkinson, 1996). The unexpected 
costs to victims may also be in the form of emotional and/or physical costs (e.g. Glaeser, 1999). 
They can be exceptionally large in relation to violent and sexual crimes. They do not only lower 
the quality of life but can also lead to efficiency losses through a reduction in working hours 
and a decline in labour productivity (Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 2004). Thus all crimes, that 
include one or more victims, have the potential to negatively affect GDP.  
All individuals face a time constraint and criminals are no exception (e.g. Glaeser, 1999). 
Criminals may hence resort to sacrificing legal work for illegal work. The trade-off between 
legal and illegal work results in an opportunity cost of producing crime, which is clearly a 
social cost and leads to a decrease in measured GDP. The trade-off may further result in loss 
of taxation since generally there are no taxes paid on criminal activity. This may lead to 
increased taxation on legal activity with the associated efficiency loss and decrease in GDP 
(e.g. Mankiw and Taylor, 2006). 
On the other hand, crime may have a positive effect on GDP through expression (1). 
Governments and individuals tend to spend resources on ways to prevent crime, for example 
police, judicial systems, prisons and private security. This kind of private and public 
consumption and investment can have a positive effect on GDP as traditionally measured.4   
                                                 
4 It is important to keep in mind that in a crime-free economy these institutions would be unnecessary and the 
resources used by them could be used in a more efficient manner.  
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3.3 From GDP to Crime 
The economic approach to crime, first developed by Becker (1968), explains how criminals 
(like all individuals) are opportunistic rational beings who compare the expected costs of 
committing a crime to the expected benefits. If they find that the expected benefits outweigh 
the expected costs they will commit the crime, while if they find that the expected costs exceed 
the expected benefits, they will not.  
With this in mind it is easy to see that as GDP increases so do opportunities for some types of 
crime. For example, increased wealth means greater expected benefits from property crime. 
Increased wealth leading to increased investment also increases vandalism opportunities and 
thus decreases the cost of vandalism. Hence, both property crime and vandalism can increase. 
Increased wealth, further, can result in increased demand for illegal goods and services. In 
return an increased demand either results in increased supply or higher prices, both of which 
may lead to more violence and corruption (United Nations Office on Drug and Crime, 2009). 
Additionally, some research has found that an increase in income may result in an abusive 
husband to become more violent (Tauchen, Witte and Long, 1991). Hence, GDP could 
positively affect crime rates.  
On the other hand, as GDP decreases, people become poorer with the associated increase in 
the need for money, resulting in a possible increase in certain crimes. For example property 
crime could increase, as the expected costs of property crimes go down, and the supply of 
illegal goods and services could increase. It is also possible that as GDP decreases, 
psychological stress increases resulting in increased violence (e.g. Gavrilova et al., 2000). 
Hence, GDP could negatively affect crime.  Furthermore, one of the most popular theories is 
the one concerning the relationship between unemployment and crime (Freeman, 1999; Becker, 
1968). When GDP falls unemployment tends to rise leading to an increase in various crime 
rates. So GDP could both directly and indirectly affect crime.  
3.4 Issues 
It is evident that the relationship between GDP and crime is complex. GDP can affect crime 
and crime can affect GDP, they can further affect each other both negatively and positively. 
This makes it difficult, if not impossible, to know what type of relationship to expect a priori. 
An identification challenge arises because of the probability of both GDP and crime being 
endogenous. This leads to an endogeneity bias, resulting in difficulties with estimating the true 
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relationship (Verbeek, 2012). It can, for example, lead to a result of cointegration when in fact 
there is none, implying a spurious regression (Blomquist and Westerlund, 2014). Furthermore, 
endogeneity makes it almost impossible to estimate the true causal relationship without having 
the benefit of an exogenous shock (and even then it is difficult) (Verbeek, 2012). By applying 
time-series models and simultaneous equation models it is possible to reduce the probability of 
the endogeneity bias (Brandt and Williams, 2007).   
The complex theoretical relationship also threatens the external validity of empirical results. 
This is because the relationship between the two may differ between various countries for 
numerous reasons. However, since Sweden is one of the Nordic countries which are often 
grouped together in terms of government involvement as well as in terms of crime rates and 
crime management it is likely that these results can be generalized over all the Nordic countries. 
4. Methodology 
This chapter discusses the main econometric methods applied. The bounds-testing approach to 
cointegration, which will be used to identify a long-run relationship between GDP and various 
crime variables is explained in detail. Following, is a description of the Toda-Yamamoto 
approach to Granger causality which will be used to identify the direction of causality between 
GDP and the various crime variables.  
4.1 Cointegration 
There are several methods available for cointegration testing. The conventional methods 
include the Engle-Granger two step method and the Johansen method (e.g. Enders, 2010; 
Greene, 2008). However, this thesis applies the bounds-testing approach to cointegration 
developed by Pesaran et al. (Pesaran and Pesaran, 1997; Pesaran and Shin, 1999; Pesaran, Shin 
and Smith, 2001). It has several advantages over the other methods mentioned. First and 
foremost, it can be applied irrespective of whether the variables are integrated of order zero, 
I(0), or of order one, I(1). This is a major advantage as it is quite common that the order of 
integration is not fully known (e.g. Elliott and Stock, 1994). It is, nevertheless, important to 
note that the approach fails if a variable is I(2). The second advantage of the bounds-testing 
approach is that it has superior properties in small samples to the Engle-Granger and Johansen 
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methods (Narayan and Smith, 2004).5 More specifically, when written in the error correction 
framework the model is less vulnerable to spurious regression (Chen, 2009). As the sample 
applied here only contains 63 observations this is indeed a valuable feature. Last but not least 
the approach is simple to understand, implement and interpret.  
The bounds-testing approach consists of two main steps.6 The first one involves estimating a 
conditional (or unrestricted) error-correction model (ECM) on the form:  
0 1 1 1 1, 2,
1 0
i
p q
t y t x t i t i j t j t
i j
y t y x y x         
 
                 (2) 
where yt represents the dependent variable and xt the independent variables. α0 is a drift term 
and t is a time trend, both of which do not necessarily need to be incorporated in the model. εt 
is the error term to be estimated and all α, β and γ are parameters to be estimated. The lag 
lengths p and q are determined by minimizing information criteria. A key assumption of the 
methodology is that the errors are serially uncorrelated. Hence, when the appropriate model is 
believed to be found it is necessary to test for autocorrelation in residuals. If autocorrelation is 
detected the number of lags in the model should be increased until the residuals are serially 
independent. The lagged values of ∆yt and the current and lagged values of ∆xt model the short-
run dynamics while the levels yt-1 and xt-1 model the long-term relationship between y and x.  
The estimation results from equation (2) are used to conduct an F-test where the null hypothesis 
of no long-term relationship is tested against a general alternative, that is:  
 H0: 0y x     
 H1: 0, 0y x    or 0, 0y x    or 0, 0y x   . 
This test follows a non-standard distribution which depends on (i) whether the variables in 
equation (2) are I(0) or I(1), (ii) the number of regressors and (iii) whether the conditional ECM 
in equation (2) contains an intercept and/or a trend. Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) report some 
critical values which are based on a sample size of 1000 observations. Narayan (2005) 
calculates critical values for 30-80 observations. As the current sample size is only of 63 
                                                 
5 The OLS estimators of both the short-run and long-run parameters are consistent in small samples, within the 
bounds-testing framework.  
6 Before applying the bounds-test it is recommended to test for all the variables’ order of integration. This both 
provides information on the data as well as makes sure that none of the variables are I(2).  
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observations Narayan’s critical values will be used. The critical values are in the form of a 
lower bound (where all variables are assumed to be I(0)) and an upper bound (where all 
variables are assumed to be I(1)). If the calculated F-statistic falls below the lower bound the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration cannot be rejected. If the calculated F-statistic exceeds the 
upper bound the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected. If the calculated F-statistic falls 
between the two bounds the test is inconclusive.  
If the null hypothesis of no long-run relationship is rejected it is possible to move on to the 
second part of the bounds-testing approach where the long-run and short-run parameters are 
estimated using a regular (restricted) ECM on the form:  
 0 1 1, 2, 1
1 0
p q
t i t i j t j t t
i j
y t y x ECM       
 
              (3) 
where yt is the dependent variable and xt represents the independent variables. β, θ and ϕ are 
parameters to be estimated. Again, the model does not need to include an intercept nor a trend. 
p and q are determined via information criteria. εt is a white noise disturbance term. The ECM 
term is obtained through the estimation of the long-run equilibrium: 0 1 2t t ty a a t a x u       
and 1 1 0 1 2 1ˆ ˆ ˆt t tECM y a a t a x        .
7 The estimated coefficients, 1,
ˆ
i  and 2,
ˆ
i  show the short-
run dynamics of the relationship. ϕ is the speed of adjustment parameter which shows how fast 
any deviations from the long-run equilibrium are corrected.  
4.2 Granger Causality 
If two variables are cointegrated there must exist Granger causality between them, either 
unidirectional or bidirectional (Granger, 1988). Furthermore, the non-existence of a 
cointegration relationship does not exclude the possibility of a short-run relationship and 
Granger causality. Hence, whatever the results of the cointegration tests it is possible to test for 
Granger causality between GDP and various crimes.  
It is important to keep in mind that Granger causality tests do not provide evidence of the 
traditional meaning of causality: xt is said to Granger cause yt if yt is better predicted using the 
lagged values of both xt and yt than if only lagged values of yt are used (Granger, 1988). Granger 
causality does not exclude the possibility of the effect being through another variable, i.e. the 
                                                 
7 As before, the constant and the trend do not need to be included in the model.  
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relationship to be spurious (e.g. He and Maekawa, 2001). So when looking at the results of the 
causality tests one should be cautious with over-interpreting the meaning. 
The usual way of testing for Granger causality is through a VAR model or a VECM depending 
on if the variables are cointegrated or not. This method assumes that the researcher can safely 
determine if the variables are integrated, cointegrated or stationary. Furthermore the legitimacy 
of the results is dependent upon this information being accurate (Toda and Yamomoto, 1995). 
But traditional unit root tests (e.g. the augmented Dickey-Fuller test) are known to suffer both 
from low power and distorted size in the sense that they over-reject the null (e.g. DeJong, 1992; 
Schwert, 1989; Enders, 2010). 
While this thesis will partly apply these conventional Granger causality methods, the focus will 
be on a more robust approach, the Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality approach. The Toda-
Yamamoto approach is independent of whether the variables are integrated, cointegrated or 
trend stationary (Toda and Yamamoto, 1995). The basic idea of the procedure is to estimate a 
simple VAR model on the form: 
 
1 1
p m p m
t y i t i j t j t
i j
y y x   
 
 
 
        
 
1 1
p m p m
t x i t i j t j t
i j
x x y u  
 
 
 
        
Where yt and xt are the variables of interest, αy and αx are constants, βi, γj, δi and θj are parameters 
to be estimated. εt and ut are white noise processes. p is the optimal lag length of the model (the 
number of lags that minimizes information criteria) and m is the maximum order of integration 
of the variables of interest.8 The VAR model is estimated with OLS.  
To test if xt Granger causes yt one can use an F-test to test the null hypothesis 
0 1 2: ... 0pH        against a general alternative. If the null hypothesis is rejected one can 
conclude that xt Granger causes yt. Similarly to test if yt Granger causes xt one can test the null 
hypothesis 0 1 2: ... 0pH        against a general alternative.  
                                                 
8 For example, if one of the variables is I(0) and the other is I(1) then m = 1.  
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5. Data 
The data used are two categories of time series; GDP and crime variables. All series are annual 
and span the years 1950-2012, resulting in a small sample of only 63 observations. Data on 
current price GDP is retrieved from Statistics Sweden (2014) and is transformed into fixed 
priced GDP (Yt) with base year 2012. The crime data constitutes reported crime rates collected 
from the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brottsförebyggande rådet, Brå) (Brå, 
2013a). The data is then categorized into six groups: (i) total crime (TCt), (ii) violent and sexual 
crime, (VSt); (iii) property crime (Pt), (iv) fraud (Ft), (v) vandalism (Vat) and (vi) drug crimes 
(Dt). Total crime includes all incidents reported as crime by the police, customs or prosecutors 
in the country. Crimes are recorded in the time period they are reported in irrespective of 
whether the crime was committed in the same period or not. Furthermore, the reported crime 
statistics also includes crime reported in Sweden but committed abroad (Brå, n.d.a). Brå 
categorizes violent crime to include crime against life and health as well as sexual offenses. 
Property crime includes all reported thefts, robberies and stealing. Fraud includes all reported 
acts of fraud and other acts of dishonesty. Drug crime is defined as crimes against the narcotics 
drug act (Brå, n.d.a).   
It is important to realise that reported crime data only includes a fraction of the actual crime 
rate. The gap between the reported crime rate and the true crime rate is often referred to as the 
dark figure of crime (Bidermann and Reiss, 1967).  If the dark figure of crime were constant 
over time it would not pose a big problem when looking at the long-run relationship between 
crime and GDP (or other variables for that matter). It could affect the coefficient estimates 
resulting in a downward bias since the reported crime rate, in most cases, underestimates the 
true level of crime. The statistical significance should, however, remain unbiased. But as is 
pointed out by Biderman and Reiss (1967) the gap varies between types of crimes and over 
time and space. Hence fluctuations in reported crime may be due to changes in reporting rather 
than changes in the true crime rate. This difference in volatility results in a measurement bias 
when estimating the relationship between GDP and crime.  
Although this is highly disadvantageous, it is in general difficult to get around it when 
analysing crime. One option is to use data from victimization surveys, which have recently 
started to be conducted in Sweden. While these could give more accurate crime rates they 
would still be faulty as surveys typically suffer from various biases (see e.g. Choi and Pak, 
2005). Perhaps the ideal solution would be to structure a kind of crime index by combining the 
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reported crime rate with the crime rate stated in victimization surveys. However, this is not a 
feasible possibility for this thesis since victimization surveys have only been conducted in 
Sweden since 2006 (Brå, 2006). Furthermore, the surveys purely focus on crimes against the 
person which fall into the categories of violent crime, property crime and fraud. Hence, they 
provide no information on the true number of total crimes, vandalism nor drug crime. But it is 
interesting that they indicate that in 2012 only 33% of total crimes against the person were 
reported to the police, but in 2005 this number was even lower, at 21% (Brå, 2013b; Brå 2006). 
If the report rate is increasing over time then the measurement bias should be decreasing.  
5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 shows the mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum of the seven time series. 
GDP is measured as GDP per capita while the crime variables are measured as crime per 
100,000 capita.9 Figures 1 and 2 show the evolution of the variables from 1950 to 2012. Note 
that GDP is measured on the right-hand axis while the crime trends are measured on the left 
axis. 
 
Table 1 and figures 1 and 2 show that real GDP per capita has been continuously increasing 
with the exceptions of the early 1990s and the crisis starting in 2008. Despite the crisis, real 
GDP was at its all-time high in 2011 with over 372 thousand SEK per capita and it was only 
slightly lower in 2012. Average GDP per capita in Sweden was approximately 212 thousand 
SEK annually in the period from 1950 to 2012.  
Reported total crime rates have been rising steadily since 1950. They were at their lowest in 
1950 at almost 2,800 reported crimes per 100,000 capita. Interestingly, they reached their 
                                                 
9 When doing the statistical analysis all variables will be measured in per 100,000 capita to simplify interpretation 
of results.  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics.  
 Mean Std. Dev. Max. Min. 
GDP 211,866 85,241 372,361 88,478 
Total crime 9,834 4,179 15,048 2,771 
Violent crime  498 321 1,181 157 
Property crime 5,573 2,139 8,618 1,570 
Fraud 685 343 1,351 208 
Vandalism 840 590 2,167 72 
Drug crime 333 286 990 0 
Source: Statistics Sweden (2013) and Brå (2013a) and author‘s calculations. 
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maximum in 2009 when the recent financial crisis was at its peak. Total reported offences 
increased dramatically between 1950 and 1990. Like can be seen on figure 1, this trend is 
primarily driven by an increase in property crime, more specifically theft (Estrada, Pettersson 
and Shannon, 2012). Since 1990, property crime has been decreasing. Despite this decrease 
total crime has continued to increase. This is partly due to a substantial increase in reported 
vandalism which between 2007 and 2009 had a sharp increase reaching a maximum of 2,169 
reported incidents per 100,000 capita in 2009. Between 2009 and 2010 reported vandalism fell 
by approximately 20%.  
 
Violent crime has been increasing steadily since 1950, although not as fast as vandalism. The 
trend has an average of 498 reported incidents per 100,000 capita, ranging from a minimum of 
157 in 1952 to a maximum of 1,181 in 2011. Fraud has had some fluctuations. It increased until 
the 1990s when an extensive change was made in the Swedish tax system (Regeringskansliet, 
2010). It then decreased until around 2002 where it started to increase again reaching its 
maximum in 2012 with 1,351 frauds being reported per 100,000 capita. Reported drug crimes 
in Sweden were almost non-existent until in the late 1960s. Since then they have increased to 
around 990 reports per 100,000 population. They still remain quite infrequent compared to 
other crimes, being less than 7% of total crimes. However, as has been mentioned some types 
of crime tend to be less reported than others. According to Brå, drug crimes are systematically 
underreported and constitute a much larger part of the true crime rate than is recorded. 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of GDP, total crime and property crime, 1950-2012.  
Source: Statistics Sweden (2013) and Brå (2013a) 
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Moreover, drug crimes are believed to be the most common form of criminal activity in Sweden 
(Brå, n.d.b).   
 
Table 2 shows the calculated correlation between all the variables. The first row shows a very 
strong positive correlation between GDP and violent crime and GDP and vandalism with 
correlation coefficients of approximately 0.98. The correlation between GDP and total crime 
is 0.91 while it is 0.83 between GDP and drug crimes, and 0.73 between GDP and property 
crime. The correlation is the weakest between GDP and fraud where the coefficient is 0.59. 
The correlation between different types of crimes is also fairly strong, ranging from 0.51 to 
0.97.  
 
 
Figure 2: Evolution of GDP, violent crime, fraud, vandalism and drug crime, 1950-
2012.  
Source: Statistics Sweden (2013) and Brå (2013a) 
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Table 2: Correlation coefficients. 
 GDP Total Violent Property Fraud Vandalism Drug 
GDP 1.000 0.911 0.975 0.726 0.585 0.982 0.831 
Total   1.000 0.860 0.927 0.746 0.924 0.820 
Violent   1.000 0.645 0.515 0.972 0.804 
Property    1.000 0.642 0.751 0.597 
Fraud     1.000 0.585 0.795 
Vandalism      1.000 0.818 
Drug       1.000 
Source: Statistics Sweden (2013) and Brå (2013a) and author‘s calculations. 
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6. Empirical Results 
This chapter shows the results from an econometric analysis using, among other, the methods 
discussed in chapter 4. The chapter is organized as follows. It starts with testing for stationarity. 
It then moves on to the bounds-testing approach to cointegration to investigate the existence of 
a long-run relationship between GDP and crime. Following this, VECM will be estimated to 
obtain the long-run equilibrium and short-run dynamics. Finally, Toda-Yamamoto method is 
used to test for Granger causality to get implications of the direction of causality between GDP 
and crime. The chapter concludes with a discussion on the empirical findings.  
6.1 Stationarity 
The data is tested for its order of integration using Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillips-
Perron (PP) and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) tests. The ADF and PP tests have 
a null hypothesis of a unit root while the KPSS test tests the null of stationarity. The results for 
the tests are shown in table 3.   
The results of the tests are somewhat unexpected. In figures 1 and 2, most if not all of the series 
seem non-stationary. This is only partially confirmed by the tests. All three tests indicate this 
in the case of GDP (Yt), violent and sexual crime (VSt) and fraud (Ft). However, when the model 
contains an intercept, the null of a unit root is rejected for property crime (Pt), drug crime (Dt) 
and vandalism (Vat) at the 5% level, according to the ADF and PP tests. The null is also rejected 
for total crime at the 5% level according to the PP but at the 10% level according to the ADF. 
The KPSS test rejects the null of stationarity for all variables when the model contains an 
intercept. Hence, the results from the ADF, PP and KPSS tests are to a certain extent 
conflicting. When the models contain an intercept and a trend the null is not rejected for any 
variables according to the ADF and PP tests. The same results are found by the KPSS test 
except for violent and sexual crimes where it is not possible to reject the null.  
After taking first differences, the null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected for all series 
according to the ADF and PP tests, regardless of whether the model contains an intercept or an 
intercept and a trend. However, when the model contains an intercept the KPSS test results are 
that for four out of seven variables, i.e. total crime, property crime, drug crime and vandalism, 
the null hypothesis of stationarity is rejected, suggesting that these four variables may be 
integrated of order 2. When including both an intercept and a trend the null is not rejected for 
any variables except property crime.  
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This inconsistency between the different stationarity tests creates a certain uncertainty about 
the variables’ true order of integration. This can be problematic for the analysis that follows. 
While the bounds-testing approach is not dependent on whether the variables are I(0) or I(1), 
the KPSS results indicating a possibility of I(2) variables is worrisome.  
The inconsistencies may be explained by the tests’ limitations. It is widely acknowledged that 
unit root tests generally suffer from low power as well as distorted size. That is, the tests are 
known to suffer from both type I and type II errors (e.g. DeJong, 1992; Schwert, 1989; Enders, 
2010). Thus, the tests are prone to yield incorrect conclusions. Another possible reason for the 
contradictory results of the stationarity tests is the existence of structural breaks in the data 
(Enders, 2010).  
Table 3: Unit root test results. 
 ADF tests Phillips-Perron KPSS1 
 Intercept Intercept + trend Intercept Intercept + trend Intercept Intercept + trend 
ln(Yt) -1.448 
(0.553) 
-2.194 
(0.484) 
-1.487 
(0.533) 
-1.750 
(0.717) 
0.986 0.156 
ln(TCt) -2.869 
(0.055) 
-0.757 
(0.964) 
-3.030 
(0.038) 
-0.645 
(0.973) 
0.903 0.250 
ln(Pt) -3.794 
(0.005) 
-0.429 
(0.984) 
-3.571 
(0.009) 
1.142 
(1.000) 
0.803 0.254 
ln(VSt) 0.208 
(0.971) 
-3.170 
(0.100) 
0.299 
(0.977) 
-3.165 
(0.101) 
0.997 0.135 
ln(Dt) -3.150 
(0.028) 
-1.809 
(0.688) 
-3.216 
(0.024) 
-1.805 
(0.690) 
0.774 0.234 
ln(Ft) -1.504 
(0.525) 
-1.814 
(0.686) 
-1.499 
(0.528) 
-1.851 
(0.668) 
0.608 0.176 
ln(Vat) -3.657 
(0.007) 
-0.673 
(0.971) 
-4.767 
(0.000) 
-0.228 
(0.991) 
0.960 0.258 
       
∆ln(Yt) -5.301 
(0.000) 
-5.428 
(0.000) 
-5.157 
(0.000) 
-5.207 
(0.000) 
0.293 0.067 
∆ln(TCt) -6.744 
(0.000) 
-7.126 
(0.000) 
-6.744 
(0.000) 
-7.123 
(0.000) 
0.827 0.078 
∆ln(Pt) -6.358 
(0.000) 
-6.911 
(0.000) 
-6.359 
(0.000) 
-13.110 
(0.000) 
1.202 0.414 
∆ln(VSt) -7.622 
(0.000) 
-7.618 
(0.000) 
-7.626 
(0.000) 
-7.624 
(0.000) 
0.137 0.101 
∆ln(Dt) -4.589 
(0.000) 
-8.151 
(0.000) 
-7.549 
(0.000) 
-8.151 
(0.000) 
0.612 0.097 
∆ln(Ft) -8.637 
(0.000) 
-8.548 
(0.000) 
-8.577 
(0.000) 
-8.494 
(0.000) 
0.119 0.098 
∆ln(Vat) -6.350 
(0.000) 
-7.807 
(0.000) 
-6.384 
(0.000) 
-8.108 
(0.000) 
0.879 0.062 
p-values for the tests are in parentheses. ∆ represents the first difference.  
1 Critical values for the KPSS test are (i) with intercept; 1%    0.739   (ii) with intercept and trend; 1%    0.216 
     5%    0.463       5%    0.146 
    10%   0.347    10%    0.119 
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In order to investigate this possibility further Perron unit root tests for data with a structural 
break are conducted for all the variables. The Perron test tests the null hypothesis of a unit root 
and a structural break either in the intercept or in the intercept and in the trend, depending on 
the specification of the test.  
The main results of the Perron tests show that a structural break in the series may be the cause 
of the non-rejection of the unit root null hypothesis in the ADF and PP tests.10 However, when 
looking at figures 1 and 2 it is apparent that property crime is the only series that shows a clear 
structural break in the trend; having a positive slope until the late 1990s and a negative slope 
thereafter. While total crime has a fairly stable upward trend both vandalism and drug crime 
show fluctuations, but none of the three show an obvious structural break in the long-run trend. 
Hence, it is considered more probable that the contradictory results of the unit root tests are 
simply a consequence of the lower power of the tests, except in the case of property crime.  
To further look into the possibility of a structural break in property crime a Quandt-Andrews 
unknown breakpoint test is used. It tests for a structural break in the data when the breakpoint 
is unknown.11 The test results show that a breakpoint is found in property crime in the year 
1997, which corresponds well with what was expected from analysing figure 1. On this basis, 
the following analysis will include a structural break dummy when the property crime series is 
used.12  
Even though the KPSS results indicate the possibility of I(2) variables both the ADF, PP and 
Perron tests indicate otherwise. This allows us to continue as all the series are I(1). However, 
this is still an important issue to keep in mind as the properties of the bounds-tests fail if one 
of the variables is I(2).  
6.2 Cointegration  
Following Narayan and Smyth (2004), bounds-tests for cointegration are conducted employing 
a model including an intercept but no trend:  
                                                 
10 Since most of the results of the Perron tests do not directly affect the continuation of the study the detailed 
results are reported in Appendix 1 along with a short discussion.  
11 This is done by implementing a Chow test for every date within the sample period except for the first and last 
7.5% of the total sample period. The Chow test statistics are then summarized into one statistic for testing the null 
hypothesis of no breakpoint (EViews, 2009). 
12 The dummy is defined so it is equal to 1 until 1997 and 0 thereafter. This assumes a constant relationship 
between GDP and property crime over time but that the change in trend is because of some exogenous change.  
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where Yt represents GDP per 100.000 capita and Cit crimes per 100.000 capita. The subscript i 
is used to represent the different types of crimes. It is important that the coefficients in the 
models remain unrestricted when testing for a long-run relationship in order to prevent pre-
testing problems. Thus the number of lags included in the models (p and q) is determined using 
the Schwartz-Bayesian information criterion (SBC), and statistically insignificant coefficients 
are kept in the model. To test for autocorrelation Breusch-Godfrey tests are applied to all 
models. Should the model show any signs of serial correlation the number of lags in the model 
is increased until no autocorrelation is detected.  
The key results of the bounds-testing approach are reported in table 4.13 The table shows the 
90% and 95% critical values for the bounds-tests assuming an unrestricted intercept and no 
trend (Narayan, 2005).14  
When GDP is modelled with (i) total crime, (ii) violent and sexual crime and (iii) fraud, the 
corresponding F-statistics are found to be lower than the 95% lower critical value. This is 
irrespective of which variable is used as the dependent one. This implies no cointegration and 
hence no long-run relationship between the variables. However, this does not exclude a 
possible short-run relationship.  
When property crime and GDP are modelled together with GDP as the dependent variable, the 
F-statistic is found to be higher than the 95% upper critical value. This implies the existence 
of a long-run relationship between GDP and property crime. However, the same result is not 
found when property crime is modelled as the dependent variable.  
                                                 
13 For more detailed estimation results the reader can turn to Appendix. 
14 Including a trend in the models where it could be suitable did not change the results of the cointegration test.  
22 
 
When drug crime is modelled as the dependent variable with GDP as the independent variable 
the corresponding F-statistic implies a long-run relationship between drug crime and GDP. 
However, if GDP is modelled as the 
dependent variable then the F-statistic is 
lower than the 95% lower critical bound 
implying no cointegration. When 
vandalism is modelled as the dependent 
variable with GDP, the calculated F-
statistic exceeds the 95% upper bound 
critical value implying a long-term 
relationship between GDP and 
vandalism. If GDP is modelled as the 
dependent variable the estimated F-
statistic is found to be lower than the 95% 
lower critical value, implying no 
cointegration. 
Theoretically, results of cointegration tests should be invariant of which variable is used as the 
dependent one (e.g. Enders, 2010). The fact that the results of the bounds-testing approach 
depend on which variable is the dependent one is a very undesirable property which makes it 
harder to get clear conclusions. However, the next step of the bounds-testing approach involves 
estimating VECMs which will either strengthen the evidence for cointegration or undermine 
it. Hence, at this point, we conclude that a long-term relationship may exist between property 
crime and GDP, vandalism and GDP and drug crime and GDP. Other crime categories show 
no signs of a long-term relationship with GDP. 
6.3 Error Correction Models 
For those models that exhibit evidence of cointegration, it is now possible to move onto the 
second step of the bounds-testing approach, which involves estimating a long-run equilibrium 
relationship and short-run dynamics (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2001). This is done by 
estimating a long-run equilibrium and a corresponding VECM for each relationship.  
Table 4: Bounds-test results 
Critical values1  
 I(0) I(1) 
95%  5.125 6.000 
90% 4.145 4.950 
Bounds-test Results 
 t tF Y TC  3.126  t tF TC Y  4.113 
 t tF Y P 6.711  t tF P Y 2.635 
 t tF Y VS  2.445  t tF VS Y  2.151 
 t tF Y D 0.571  t tF D Y 7.287 
 t tF Y Fr  2.196  t tF Fr Y  1.148 
 t tF Y Va  2.478  t tF Va Y  6.444 
1 Source: Narayan (2005).  
F(Yt|TCt) gives the F-value when Yt is modelled as the 
dependent variable and TCt as the independent variable.  
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Table 5 shows the preferred VECMs15 along with their cointegration relationships and 
traditional Granger causality results. The cointegration relationships show the long-run 
equilibrium relationship between the variables; they show a linear combination of the variables 
that is stationary. They are normalized so that the coefficient for the dependent variable from 
the bounds-tests results is one. The three equilibria imply a positive long-run correlation 
between GDP and property crime, GDP and vandalism and GDP and drug crime. This implies 
that if GDP grows over time, which most find desirable, these crimes will also increase unless 
something breaks up the equilibrium.  
 
                                                 
15 For the estimation of long-run effects and short-run dynamics a more parsimonious model is advisable than 
when testing for the existence of long-run relationship (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2001). It is still important that 
the models include enough lags not to suffer from serial correlation.  
 
Table 5: VECM results. 
 GDP-Property GDP-Vandalism GDP-Drug 
 
Dep. 
(1)   
∆ln(Yt) 
(2)  
∆ln(Pt) 
(3)  
∆ln(Yt) 
(4)   
∆ln(Vat) 
(5)   
∆ln(Yt) 
(6)   
∆ln(Dt) 
Const. 0.042*** 
(4.434) 
-0.037 
(-1.392) 
0.019*** 
(4.143) 
0.028** 
(2.013) 
0.015*** 
(3.604) 
0.175** 
(2.233) 
∆ln(Cit-1) -0.128*** 
(-2.866) 
0.118 
(0.934) 
-0.052 
(-1.326) 
0.003 
(0.022) 
0.006 
(0.870) 
-0.053 
(-0.425) 
∆ln(Yt-1) 0.281** 
(2.493) 
0.747** 
(2.346) 
0.303** 
(2.422) 
0.936** 
(2.413) 
0.317** 
(2.524) 
-0.838 
(-0.351) 
Dummy -0.031*** 
(-2.758) 
0.047 
(1.499) 
    
ECTt-1 -0.076*** 
(-3.721) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.006* 
(-1.678) 
-0.039*** 
(-3.390) 
-0.001 
(-0.951) 
-0.066*** 
(-2.955) 
Adj. R2 0.272 0.191 0.124 0.293 0.104 0.088 
SBC -4.838 -2.759 -4.702 -2.436 -4.680 1.211 
                                              Cointegration relationships 
GDP-Property:    1 1 1ˆln 19.968 0.436 lnt t PtY P       *** 
GDP-Vandalism:    1 1 1ˆln 2.685 0.383 lnt t VatVa Y         
GDP-Drug:    1 1 1ˆln 14.606 0.804 lnt t DtD Y         
Granger Causality 
GDP-property:  t tF Y P   8.212*** [0.004]  t tF P Y   
5.502** 
[0.019] 
 
GDP-vandalism:  t tF Y Va   1.758 [0.185]  t tF Va Y   
5.820** 
[0.016] 
 
GDP-drug:  t tF Y D   0.758 [0.384]  t tF D Y   
0.123 
[0.725] 
 
*, **, *** note satistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectiely. 
t-statistics are in parentheses. p-values are in squared brackets.  
The ECTt-1 term in the VECM represents the corresponding estimated residuals from the 
cointegration relationships. 
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Models (1) and (2) in table 5 show the VECM for GDP and property crime. As already noted 
there is an equilibrium relationship between GDP and property crime defined by the first 
cointegration relationship. The speed of adjustment parameter to this equilibrium, estimated to 
be -0.076, is significant at the 1% level in model (1). This implies that GDP reacts to correct 
any deviations from the long-run equilibrium between GDP and property crime by 
approximately 7.6% annually, a sluggish adjustment. A change in property crime however, 
does not react to any disequilibrium. This can be seen from the insignificance of the speed of 
adjustment parameter in model (2) as well as that the coefficient is approximately zero.  
The short-run parameters in model (1) are both significant at the 5% level.16 The coefficient 
for the lagged value of GDP (∆ln(Yt-1)) shows that a previous increase in GDP leads to a 
continuing but a smaller increase in the present period. The coefficient for the lagged value of 
property crime (∆ln(Cit-1)) in model (1)) shows that an increase in property crime significantly 
reduces GDP in the short run. More specifically, as property crime increases by 1% GDP 
decreases by almost 0.13% in the short run. Although 0.13% of GDP does not seem as much it 
is still a significant amount. For example, it equals around 484 million SEK per 100.000 capita 
in 2012. In model (2) the short-run parameter for lagged GDP has a statistically significant 
effect on property crime showing that as GDP increases by 1% then in the short-run property 
crime increases by 0.75%. However, it is important to remember that these parameter estimate 
are only short-run estimates. Furthermore, parameter estimates are rarely accurate and one 
should not over-interpret them.  
The statistically significant speed of adjustment parameter in model (1) indicates that property 
crime Granger causes GDP in the long run. Furthermore, the significant short-run parameters 
in models (1) and (2) imply that GDP Granger causes property crime and property crime 
Granger-Causes GDP in the short run. Conducting simple Granger causality tests (last portion 
of table 5) verifies this hypothesis.  
Models (3) and (4) represent the VECM for GDP and vandalism. The speed of adjustment 
parameter in model (3) is significant at the 10% level while the one in model (4) is significant 
at the 1% level. This implies that both GDP and vandalism respond to deviations from the long-
run equilibrium. According to the parameter estimates, GDP responds to a positive 
disequilibrium by decreasing by 0.6% annually while vandalism decreases by 3.9%.  
                                                 
16 The short-run parameters are the coefficients for ∆ln(Cit-1) and ∆ln(Yt-1), as is explained in section 4.1.  
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Both speed of adjustment parameters in models (3) and (4) are statistically significant which 
implies that GDP Granger causes vandalism and vandalism Granger causes GDP in the long 
run. However, while the short-run parameters corresponding with vandalism are insignificant 
in both models the parameters for GDP are significant and indicate a positive effect. This 
further indicates that GDP positively Granger-causes vandalism in the short run but not vice-
versa. Again, this is supported by the results of the direct Granger causality tests in the last part 
of table 5.   
Models (5) and (6) show the VECM for GDP and drug crime. The speed of adjustment 
parameter is only statistically significant in model (6). It implies that in response to any positive 
deviations from the long-run equilibrium between GDP and drug crime, drug crime decreases 
by 6.6% annually. This further implies that GDP Granger causes drug crime in the long run. 
However, the change in GDP does not respond to any long-run disequilibrium. The short-run 
parameters show that GDP does not significantly affect drug crime nor drug crime GDP. This 
implies that there is no short-run Granger-causality between the variables. This is further shown 
by the traditional Granger causality tests reported in the bottom of table 5. 
The power of the traditional Granger causality test is not very high (Enders, 2010). Hence, the 
results from the Granger tests can be misleading. A more robust method for testing for Granger 
causality is applied in the next section.  
6.4 More on Granger causality 
Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality tests are implemented for GDP along with all crime 
categories. The Toda-Yamamoto Granger causality tests are improved versions of the standard 
Granger causality tests reported in table 5 (Toda and Yamamoto, 1995). The following VAR 
models are estimated  
 
1 1
p m p m
t Y h t h j it j t
h j
Y Y C   
 
 
 
        
 
1 1
i
p m p m
it C h it h j t j t
h j
C C Y u  
 
 
 
        
Where Yt is GDP and Cit is crime i with i being an index for the six crime categories. p is chosen 
by minimizing the SBC information criterion, while still maintaining no autocorrelation. m 
represents the maximum order of integration for the two time series in each model; m = 1 in all 
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cases. Cit is said to Granger cause Yt if the 0 1 2: ... 0pH        is rejected. Similarly Yt is 
said to Granger cause Cit if 0 1 2: ... 0pH        is rejected. The results are shown in table 
6.  
While it is not possible to reject the null 
that GDP does not Granger cause total 
crime, it is possible to reject the null 
that total crime does not Granger cause 
GDP. As the previous analysis did not 
imply a long-run relationship it seems 
reasonable to infer that total crime 
Granger causes GDP but only in the 
short run.  
While the more traditional Granger 
causality tests indicated bidirectional 
causality between GDP and property 
crime, the Toda-Yamamoto method implies a unidirectional causation, running from GDP to 
property crime.  
No Granger causality is found between GDP and violent and sexual crimes. On the other hand, 
a significant causality is found between fraud and GDP. More precisely, the results imply that 
fraud Granger causes GDP at the 1% level and that GDP Granger causes fraud at approximately 
the 10% level. This, along with cointegration results, implies a bidirectional causality in the 
short run. 
It is found that vandalism does not Granger cause GDP but that GDP Granger causes vandalism 
at the 5% level. The results further indicate no short-run causality between GDP and drug 
crime. These results corresponds with the results from the traditional Granger causality tests 
shown in table 5.  
The results from the Toda-Yamamoto method correspond to the results of the traditional 
Granger causality test by the most part as they suggests that GDP Granger causes vandalism in 
the short run but vandalism does not Granger cause GDP. Furthermore, they confirm that there 
is no short-run Granger causality between GDP and drug crime. However, although the 
traditional Granger tests indicated bidirectional causality between GDP and property crime the 
Table 6: Granger causality results. 
F-test results w/o structural break 
 t tF Y TC  =  6.105** (0.047)  t tF TC Y   
4.106 
(0.128) 
 t tF Y P   1.740 (0.419)  t tF P Y   
6.258** 
(0.043) 
 t tF Y VS   1.612 (0.447)  t tF VS Y   
1.709 
(0.426) 
 t tF Y D   0.471 (0.493)  t tF D Y   
0.097 
(0.756) 
 t tF Y Fr   7.625*** (0.006)  t tF Fr Y   
2.662* 
(0.103) 
 t tF Y Va   1.132 (0.568)  t tF Va Y   
6.453** 
(0.040) 
*, **, *** note satistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels respectiely. 
p-values are shown in parentheses.  
F(Yt|TCt) gives the F-value when Yt is modelled as the 
depent variable and TCt as the independent variable.  
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Toda-Yamamoto method simply implies that GDP Granger causes property crime but not vice 
versa. Hence, the causal relationship between GDP and property crime remains unclear.  
6.5 Main Results and Theoretical Implications 
The main results from the empirical analysis imply long-term equilibriums between GDP and 
property crime, drug crime and vandalism. These equilibriums all show a positive relationship. 
No long-run relationship was found between GDP and total crime, violent and sexual crime 
and fraud. Furthermore, short-run Granger causality is found between GDP and all crime 
categories except for violent and sexual crime and drug crime. This implies that although there 
is some kind of a relationship between GDP and five out of six crime categories analysed in 
this thesis, there is no relationship between GDP and violent and sexual crimes. Following is a 
more detailed discussion of the findings along with theoretical implications.  
As has been stated, GDP is found to have a long-run equilibrium relationship with property 
crime. While in the long run they are positively correlated, in the short-run property crime 
negatively affects GDP but GDP positively affects property crime, according to the VECM 
results. However, these results are somewhat ambiguous as the Toda-Yamamoto method 
concludes that GDP Granger causes property crime but not vice versa. Hence, there is evidence 
supporting that the positive effect of GDP on property crime is stronger than the negative effect 
of property crime on GDP. This is the opposite of Krüger’s (2011) results but he found that in 
the short run economic activity and property crime move counter-cyclically. Taking that into 
account the results are consistent with the theory that property crime can have a short-run 
negative effect on GDP through decreased property rights, trade and accumulation. However, 
in the long run as GDP increases so do the expected benefits of property crime resulting in an 
increased number of property crimes. 
GDP is found to share a long-run equilibrium with vandalism. While both respond to maintain 
this equilibrium in the long-run, in the short-run GDP Granger causes vandalism but not vice 
versa. These results are consistent regardless of what methodology is used. Both the estimates 
of the long-run relationship and the short-run imply that the effect is positive. These results are 
in accordance with the theory that as GDP increases so do investments. This further decreases 
the opportunity costs of vandalism (e.g. time cost of finding the object to vandalise) and hence 
vandalism increases.  
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GDP and drug crime also share a long-run equilibrium relationship which suggests that GDP 
Granger causes drug crime in the long run. However, no short-run Granger causality was found, 
neither by applying traditional methods nor the Toda-Yamamoto method. The results imply 
the theory that as GDP increases people become richer which leads to increased drug 
production and use, but the effects only appear in the long run. However, as drug crime is 
believed to be the most common crime while it is also the least reported crime, the data may 
not give very reliable results (Brå, n.d.b).17 Krüger (2011) found that GDP and drug crime in 
Sweden move pro-cyclically which is consistent with our results and further strengthens the 
evidence of the results found.  
It is a bit surprising that while some crimes were found to have an equilibrium relationship 
with GDP, such a relationship was not detected between total crime and GPD. However, 
Granger causality was found running from total crime to GDP, so most likely the data was 
simply not discriminating enough to detect the relationship when adding all crimes together. 
However, whether the Granger causality is positive or negative remains unknown. The 
relationship is unquestionably complicated and may differ between time periods and in the 
crime categories mostly responsible for the variation within total crime. As more information 
is necessary to make any meaningful deductions we will simply conclude that fluctuations in 
total crime lead to fluctuations in GDP. 
No cointegration nor Granger causality was found between GDP and violent and sexual crime. 
Hence, there does not seem to be any systematic relationship between GDP and violent and 
sexual crime. This is not a surprising result as the motivation for these types of crimes is more 
likely to be mental or emotional than financial or logical (see e.g. Lawteacher, n.d. for an 
overview of literature discussing the reasons for violent crime). Although it seems reasonable 
that declining economic activity results in increased stress and hence increased violence, this 
kind of indirect causation may not be detectable in the empirical data.  
While no cointegration is established between GDP and fraud the Granger causality tests 
indicate bidirectional causality in the short run. Although, the sign of the effect remains 
undetected, it appears reasonable that GDP positively affects fraud and fraud negatively affects 
GDP.18 If so, it indicates that as GDP grows, the expected benefits from committing fraud 
increase relative to the expected costs and individuals are more inclined to commit fraudulent 
                                                 
17 The unreliable data makes it more likely that the cointegration relationship found is spurious.  
18 A simple VAR analysis reinforces this belief. 
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acts such as tax evasion and accounting crimes (which are the most common frauds reported 
to Brå (n.d.c)). However, performing such acts negatively affects GDP, which may be 
channelled through decreased property rights, declining trust etc.  
In general the results point to GDP affecting crime rather than crime affecting GDP. Thus, 
although the relationship between GDP and crime is complex, the analysis implies that GDP is 
one of the determinants of crime rather than that crime systematically affects GDP. However, 
when looking at the results of this analysis it is important to remember that the crime data used 
includes only reported crime. If the actual crime rate were used instead the results could be 
very different, depending on the evolution of the report rate over time. It is further important 
to note that there is always a possibility of the results being spurious, thus indicating a 
relationship when there is none. Nevertheless, the results are interesting and should be 
considered by policy makers.  
7. Conclusions 
This thesis has introduced new evidence on the relationship between GDP and crime in 
Sweden. It does this by investigating the existence of long-run equilibriums between GDP and 
various crime categories using annual data for the period of 1950-2012. For those relationships 
that show signs of cointegration, VECMs are estimated making it possible to distinguish 
between short-run and long-run effects. Granger causality tests further show if there exists 
short-run causality and in what directions it goes.  
It is important to keep in mind that the results found in this thesis are based on reported crime 
rate but not the true crime rate. Hence, the results are only valid to the extent that the 
fluctuations in the reported crime rate reflect the fluctuations in the true crime rate.  
The results show that GDP has a long-run equilibrium relationship with property crime, 
vandalism and drug crime. Property crime is found to Granger cause GDP both in the short run 
and in the long run. GDP also Granger causes property crime in the short run. There is a long-
run bidirectional Granger causality between GDP and vandalism. In the short-run Granger 
causality is found to run only from GDP to vandalism. In the long-run drug crime Granger 
causes GDP but no short-run causality is found, which makes the results somewhat ambiguous.  
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The findings suggest that the long-run relationships are all of positive nature. This further 
means that if GDP continues to increase over time it is not possible to expect that property 
crime, vandalism and drug crime decrease, ceteris paribus. However, some exogenous change, 
for example in the form of increased law-enforcement, may be able to break up the relationship. 
Whether this exogenous change needs to be drastic or more modest remains unknown.  
No long-run relationships are found between GDP and total crime, violent and sexual crime 
and fraud. However, bidirectional short-run Granger causality is found between GDP and fraud 
and total crime is found to Granger cause GDP. No causality is found between GDP and violent 
and sexual crime. Hence, no kind of relationship is found between GDP and violent and sexual 
crimes.  
Although, the results of the analysis cannot exclude the possibility of crime systematically 
decreasing GDP, they do not particularly imply it either. The Granger causality tests indicate 
that GDP affects crime more often than crime affects GDP. Hence, these results suggest that 
GDP is one of the determinants of crime. This further implies that when estimating the total 
cost associated with criminal activity it is not necessary to factor in the possible indirect cost 
caused by a decrease in GDP, making estimations of the costs simpler.  
Because of the various possible theoretical relationships between GDP and crime the external 
validity of the results is compromised. That is, the relationship between GDP and crime may 
differ between various countries for numerous reasons. However, since Sweden is one of the 
Nordic countries which are often grouped together in terms of government involvement as well 
as in terms of crime rates and crime management it is probable that these results can be 
generalized over all of the Nordic countries. 
While the current study provides new and valuable information for policy-makers, there still 
remains uncertainty regarding the relationship between crime and GDP. The field requires 
increased research. It is especially recommended to look at different indicators of crime rates 
than the reported crime rates. For example, victimization surveys provide an interesting option 
for researchers. It would further be of great interest to inspect the relationship between various 
components of GDP and crime.  
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Appendix 1 
The results of the Perron tests are shown in table A.1. According to the test results it is not 
possible to reject the null of a unit root in the levels of the data when the model contains a 
structural break in the intercept. The same applies when the model contains a structural break 
in both the intercept and the trend. The exception is in the case of drug crime where the null 
can be rejected, implying a possible trend-stationary series. After taking the first difference the 
null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected for all variables irrespective of whether the model 
includes an intercept or an intercept and a trend.19  
 
 
                                                 
19 However, it should be noted that in the case of vandalism when the model has an intercept and a trend the test-
statistic is 5.53 while the 5% critical value is 5.59. However, the difference is small enough to be disregarded. 
Table A.1: Results of Perron unit root test 
for data with a structural break.  
 Perron for structural1 
 Intercept Intercept + trend 
ln(Yt) -3.262 -3.712 
ln(TCt) -3.702 -3.828 
ln(Pt) -0.747 -2.361 
ln(VSt) -3.945 -3.744 
ln(Dt) -3.480 -6.163 
ln(Ft) -4.145 -3.291 
ln(Vat) -2.054 -3.639 
   
∆ln(Yt) -6.413 -6.529 
∆ln(TCt) -8.022 -8.021 
∆ln(Pt) -7.179 -7.192 
∆ln(VSt) -8.381 -8.347 
∆ln(Dt) -11.525 -11.817 
∆ln(Ft) -9.448 -9.437 
∆ln(Vat) -5.531 -5.529 
1 Critical values for the Perron‘s test are (i) with 
intercept; 1%  -5,92, 5% -5,23, 10% -4,92; (ii) 
with intercept and trend; 1% -6,32, 5% -5,59, 
10% -5,29. 
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Appendix 2 
Table A.2 shows the details of the bounds-tests results. It shows the calculated F-statistic of 
each model, the number of lags in the model, the SBC and AIC of the model and the results of 
the Breusch-Godfrey test for first, second and third order autocorrelation.  
 
 
 
 
Table A.2: Detailed results of the bounds-testing approach to 
cointegration. 
F-statistic ARDL SBC AIC LM 1 LM 2 LM 3 
F(Yt|TCt) = 3.126 (1,1) -4.723 -4.930 0.363 0.491 0.707 
F(TCt|Yt) = 4.113 (1,3) -3.083 -3.364 0.046 0.567 0.670 
F(Yt|VSt) = 2.445 (1,1) -4.606 -4.813 0.629 1.826 2.086 
F(VSt|Yt) = 2.151 (1,2) -2.961 -3.205 0.003 0.004 0.050 
F(Yt|Pt) = 3.777 (1,1) -4.672 -4.880 0.275 0.652 0.652 
F(Pt|Yt) = 6.708 (2,1) -2.743 -2.987 2.236 3.596 4.797 
F(Yt|Vat) = 2.478 (1,1) -4.608 -4.816 0.454 1.728 1.771 
F(Vat|Yt) = 6.444 (1,1) -2.331 -2.539 0.623 1.276 1.738 
F(Yt|Frt) = 2.196 (1,1) -4.683 -4.890 0.451 1.519 2.222 
F(Frt|Yt) = 1.300 (1,2) -0.397 -0.641 0.111 0.739 3.187 
F(Yt|Dt) = 0.571 (1,1) -4.553 -4.760 1.421 3.193 4.847 
F(Dt|Yt) = 7.287 (6,1) 1.338 0.940 0.337 0.592 1.938 
F(Yt|TCt) gives the F-value when Yt is modelled as the depent variable and TCt 
as the independent variable.  
LM 1, LM 2 and LM 3 show the results of the first, second and third order 
autocorrelation tests respectively. 
 
